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Introduction
Stochastic versions of the overlapping generations model of Allais (1947) and Samuel-

son (1958) can be useful models for macroeconomic policy making, but not before the
theoretical and quantitative implications of indeterminacy are properly accounted for.

1

In deterministic versions of the model, indeterminacy may exist,

in the long run as all equilibria converge to one of the steady states.

but it has no eects

2

This paper consid-

ers stochastic versions of the model and decomposes indeterminacy into two types: one
characterized by the initial conditions and one characterized by incomplete nancial
markets. We introduce a numerical algorithm to compute the entire set of competitive
equilibrium. We use simulations to approximate the volatility of consumption across
cohorts and the volatility of asset prices.

Our ndings show that indeterminacy has

long-run eects and is an order of magnitude more important than endowment shocks
in explaining long-run consumption and asset price volatility.
In deterministic overlapping generations (OLG) models, a sucient condition for

3

a determinate equilibrium is the property of gross substitution in consumption.

This

property is implausible given the empirical ndings of Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985). In the same setting, Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford (1990) and Wang
(1993) have conjectured that even if the equilibrium set is indeterminate, all equilibria
in that set converge in the long run to one of the steady states. This conjecture has been
numerically veried for a handful of canonical economies in Kehoe and Levine (1990)
and Feng (2013), where the former log-linearized the equilibrium system of equations
and the latter numerically approximated the entire equilibrium set.

4

In stochastic overlapping generations (SOLG) models, the properties of existence
and Pareto ineciency of recursive equilibria have been analyzed in Citanna and Siconol
(2010) and Henriksen and Spear (2012), respectively.

5

However, very little is known

about indeterminacy in SOLG models. Several papers have provided examples showing
the existence of a continuum of recursive (stationary Markov) equilibria (Farmer and
Woodford, 1997; Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford, 1990), but conditions for either the
existence or nonexistence of indeterminacy are unavailable. The present paper focuses
on the indeterminacy of competitive equilibria and studies its impact on the aggregate

1 See

Gale (1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1984), Kehoe and
Levine (1984), and Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell, and Woodford (1991).
2 See Kehoe and Levine (1990), Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford (1990), Wang (1993), and Feng
(2013).
3 See Gale (1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1984), Kehoe and
Levine (1984), and Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell, and Woodford (1991).
4 Gomis-Porqueras and Haro (2003, 2007) introduced techniques to characterize all equilibrium
manifolds, but their method cannot extend to the stochastic models considered in the present paper.
5 Citanna and Siconol (2010) proves generic existence of recursive equilibria, a complement to the
non-existence examples provided in Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004). Henriksen and Spear (2012)
proves that even with sequentially complete markets (number of assets equals number of states), the
recursive equilibrium allocation is not (interim) Pareto ecient. This complements Demange (2002),
which shows that the recursive equilibrium allocations are Pareto ecient if markets are sequentially
complete and a long-lived real asset in positive net supply (land) is traded.
2

economy, specically on the consumption and asset price volatility.
In deterministic OLG models, equilibrium indeterminacy arises whenever a continuum of endogenous initial period variables are consistent with equilibrium.

Each

equilibrium is indexed by the vector of initial period variables which are typically asset
prices or portfolio choices, though this paper looks at shadow prices of investment. Feng
(2013) characterizes the entire set of initial period variables consistent with equilibrium
and demonstrates that each numerically approximated equilibrium converges to one of
the steady states. Although the equilibrium set is indeterminate, there are no eects
in the long run.
This paper considers a SOLG model and characterizes two types of indeterminacy:
initial condition indeterminacy and incomplete markets indeterminacy. Initial condition indeterminacy is identical to the indeterminacy described in deterministic settings
and is indexed by the endogenous variables in the initial period. Incomplete markets
indeterminacy is a new type of indeterminacy that arises in stochastic settings.

As

the name suggests, incomplete markets is a necessary condition for incomplete markets indeterminacy. Long-run eects only occur in the presence of incomplete markets
indeterminacy.
Consider a simple incomplete markets setting with a 3-period lived representative
consumer born every period, a risk-free bond (1 asset), and 2 states of uncertainty each
period. The 3 periods of a consumer's life are denoted young, middle-aged, and old. The
equilibrium variables consist of the vector of asset prices and portfolio choices. In any
node, only two consumers participate in the bond market: the young and the middleaged. By market clearing, we only consider the portfolio choice of the middle-aged. An
equilibrium is characterized by Euler equations for the young and middle-aged (recall
we already internalized the market clearing condition).

We use the Euler equations

for the middle-aged to determine the portfolio choice for the middle-aged, reducing the
system to only Euler equations for the young and the asset prices.
In the initial period

t = 0,

the initial middle-aged and the initial old are endowed

with a wealth vector. If we x these parameters and the initial period shock, the young

t = 0 and t = 1.
There exists one equilibrium equation for the young born in period t = 0 and two for the
young born in period t = 1 (1 for each node in period t = 1). Denoting q (s0 , ..., st ) as the
asset price in period t for the history of shocks (s0 , ..., st ) , the equilibrium equations are
agents aected by the initial conditions are only those born in periods

written in the form (where the subscript y denotes the Euler equation for the young):



eey q (s0 ) , (q (s0 , s1 ))s1 ∈{1,2} = 0.


eey q (s0 , s1 ) , (q (s0 , s1 , s2 ))s2 ∈{1,2} = 0 for s1 ∈ {1, 2} .
These equations are in terms of
through

7

asset price variables, 1 for each node in periods

t=0

t = 2.

As we can see, the number of variables exceeds the number of equations.
captures the dimension of the initial condition indeterminacy. If we denote

3

S

This
as the

number of states of uncertainty each period and J as the number of assets, there are
J(1 + S) equations and J(1 + S + S 2 ) asset price variables, implying JS 2 degrees of
freedom. In the deterministic case,

S = J = 1, there exists 1 degrees of freedom,

which

6

is consistent with what Kehoe and Levine (1990) would nd for a real asset economy.

As stressed above, the presence of this form of indeterminacy in a stochastic setting is
not novel, but merely an extension of the indeterminacy analyzed by Kehoe and Levine
(1990) for the case of real assets.

Magill and Quinzii (2003) analyze indeterminacy

in stochastic OLG models with 2-period lived representative consumers.

In such a

model, one needs to introduce an innitely-lived asset that pays no dividends (usually
called at money) to facilitate inter-generational trade. Hence this model only captures
nominal indeterminacy. Kehoe and Levine (1990) consider a deterministic setting with
3-period lived consumers.

They show that indeterminacy can still exist without at

money. We restrict ourselves to an analysis of real indeterminacy by only including real

7

assets in a stochastic OLG model with 3-period lived consumers.

Including nominal

assets in a stochastic setting with 3-period lived consumers would lead to even greater
indeterminacy than what we nd in the present paper.
Continuing with our example, the progression to a new node in period

t ≥ 2 int+1

troduces 3 Euler equations for the newborn young, but 2 of these are period

middle-aged Euler equations, which are used to determine the 2 middle-aged bond
choices in period

t

t + 1.

There is then just 1 new equation, the Euler equation in period

for the newborn young, together with 2 new asset price variables, 1 for each of the 2

nodes that can arise in period

t+1:



eey q (s0 , ..., st ) , (q (s0 , ..., st , st+1 ))st+1 ∈{1,2} = 0.
With

2

new variables and only

1

new equation, there exists

the previous notation, each new node introduces
asset price variables, implying

S = J = 1,

there are

0

J(S − 1)

J

1

degree of freedom. Using

new Euler equations and

SJ

new

degrees of freedom. In the deterministic case,

degrees of freedom, consisting with the ndings in Kehoe and

Levine (1990) and Feng (2013). Under sequentially complete markets (S

= J ), there
S (S − 1) degrees of freedom, which is consistent with the ndings from Henriksen
8
Spear (2012) for the S = J = 2 case.

exist
and

6 The

comparable economy considered in Kehoe and Levine (1990) is one in which the initial
endowment of the nominal asset (money) is xed. For these economies, the authors nd 1 degree of
freedom.
7 Our asset structure is most similar to the asset structures in Citanna and Siconol (2010) and
Henriksen and Spear (2012), who analyze the properties of existence (of recursive equilibrium) and
Pareto eciency, respectively.
8 In stochastic OLG settings with consumers living for at least 3 periods, the concept of complete
and incomplete markets is more complicated than simply comparing the number of assets to the
number of possible states of uncertainty in the subsequent period. Even with sequentially complete
markets (J = S ), the asset structure is not complete in the sense that it is unable to support an interim
Pareto ecient allocation in equilibrium (see Henriksen and Spear, 2012). There are several ways to
modify the asset structure in order to complete the markets. Demange (2002) and Henrisken and
4

Our decomposition of indeterminacy into two types is stark as the indeterminacy
that we refer to as incomplete markets indeterminacy can only arise in economies with
uncertainty.

In that sense, it is quite dierent than initial condition indeterminacy,

which captures the entirety of the indeterminacy that is found in deterministic models.
Furthermore, only the former can lead to long run eects. Our objective in this paper is
not only to characterize the conditions under which incomplete markets indeterminacy
arises, but also to estimate the eects of such indeterminacy on simulated time paths
of equilibrium variables.
Formally, incomplete markets indeterminacy is present when the dimension of the
image of the equilibrium transition correspondence is strictly positive. With such an
equilibrium correspondence, there exists a continuum of next-period endogenous state
variables that are consistent with equilibrium.

This form of indeterminacy is closely

related to the concept of initial condition indeterminacy that occurs in the deterministic
setting.

If we consider the vector of variables in any period

are state variables chosen in period

t−1

t,

some of the variables

and others are determined by the policy

correspondence (in terms of the state variables).

When you analogize period

t

state

t = 0) and the period t policy variables
t = 0), then, by denition, indeterminacy in

variables to the initial conditions (period
to the initial period variables (period
period

t

is only possible if it was possible in the initial period. We have dened initial

condition indeterminacy to capture this latter eect, making it a necessary condition
for incomplete markets indeterminacy.
Our main theoretical result show that initial condition indeterminacy and incomplete markets are sucient conditions for incomplete markets indeterminacy (and hence
long-run eects).
The fact that incomplete markets indeterminacy exists is of limited importance
unless it is combined with an estimation of the eects of this indeterminacy. We apply
the numerical method developed by Feng (2013) to numerically approximate the entire
set of competitive equilibrium. In economies with incomplete markets indeterminacy, by
denition, there exists a continuum of continuation values consistent with equilibrium.
In our numerical simulations, we adopt a consistent means to select continuation values
from this continuum. We consider a variety of dierent selection rules, where we run
each simulation using a consistent selection rule throughout. The choice of the selection
rule has real eects, so we are thorough in considering a broad range of dierent selection
rules.
In each simulation, we generate a simulated vector of equilibrium variables over
time. We are particularly interested in two simulated moments: consumption volatility
and asset price volatility.

The consumption volatility is the standard deviation of

consumption across cohorts (holding xed the age of consumption).

The asset price

Spear (2012) suggest that a sequentially complete set of short-lived assets together with a long-lived
real asset in positive net supply (such as land) suce to support an interim Pareto ecient equilibrium
allocation. In this paper, we verify that such a complete asset structure would remove both types of
indeterminacy analyzed in this paper. The analysis in the present paper focuses on incomplete markets
as the conditions for complete markets are quite restrictive and unlikely to be observed in reality.
5

volatility is the standard deviation of asset prices across time.

Our initial ndings

reveal that both of these simulated volatility measures are an order of magnitude larger
than what is predicted from the endowment volatility alone. Further, when we compute
the simulated consumption volatilities after conditioning on the shock realization, we
nd that the conditional consumption volatilities are on average more than 90% as large
as the unconditional volatilities.
Next, we numerically approximate the equilibrium set in a sunspot economy. The
sunspot economy is identical to our original economy, except that the states of uncertainty are now states of extrinsic uncertainty, meaning that the endowments are
independent of the shock realization. As before, we generate simulated vectors of equilibrium variables and compute the simulated consumption and asset price volatilities.
For both variables, the simulated volatilities for the sunspot economy are on average
more than 90% as large as the simulated volatilities in the original economy with endowment risk.
Our interpretation is to attribute any volatility in equilibrium variables that cannot
be explained by fundamentals to the eects of indeterminacy. Our numerical results
suggest that indeterminacy is an order of magnitude more important in explaining
consumption and asset price volatility than endowment risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and denes the competitive equilibrium concept. Section 3 introduces an equivalent recursive formulation called Markov equilibrium, which is important for subsequent computation and simulation. Sections 4 applies the computational algorithm and presents
the simulation results. Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix contains the proofs of
our main results and further details on the algorithm.

2

The Economic Model
In this section, we rst introduce the economic environment and then provide the

competitive equilibrium denition.

2.1 Economic environment
Time is discrete
the economy.

t = 0, 1, 2, ...

At every date

t,

a new cohort of consumers enters

Each cohort consists of a representative consumer that remains in the

economy for 3 periods.

t, the economy is hit by a shock s. The shock follows a Markov chain
over a nite set S = {1, ..., S} as described by the Markov transition matrix Π with
elements π (s, σ) for all s, σ ∈ S. The observed shock in period t is st . The initial shock
s0 is known to all consumers in the economy. The history of shocks up to and including
t
period t is s = (s0 , s1 , ..., st ). The history of shocks uniquely characterizes the location
At every date

of the economy in the space of time and uncertainty, and is often called a date-event
t
or node. We use the notation (s , σ)σ∈S to refer to the set of nodes that immediately

6

(st , σ, σ 0 )σ,σ0 ∈S2

st

succeed the node

and the notation
t
follow 2 periods after the node s .

to refer to the set of nodes that

At each node, a single consumption good is traded.
The consumers are identied by the node at birth and the age a ∈ {0, 1, 2} in
t+a
the current node. The parameter ea (s
) is the endowment of a consumer of age
t+a
a in node s . This means that the consumer was born in node st . A consumer's
individual endowments follow a Markov process governed by the stationary function
e : {0, 1, 2} × S → R++ , such that for all a ∈ {0, 1, 2} and all nodes st , ea (st+a ) =

ea (st+a ).
s

Similarly, the variable
t+a

ca (st+a )

is the consumption of a consumer of age

a

in node

.

s0 ,

In the initial node
and an age

a = 2

a = 0 consumer, an age a = 1 consumer,
a = 2 consumer has the consumption c2 (s0 )
a = 1 consumer has the consumption vector

there exists an age

consumer.

The age

u(c
 2 (s0 )). The age
c1 (s0 ) , (c2 (s0 , σ))σ∈S and utility function
X
π (s0 , σ) u(c2 (s0 , σ)).
u(c1 (s0 )) + β

and utility function

σ∈S

as

st , dene the lifetime
 contingent
2
t
t
t
t
0
c(s ) = c0 (s ), (c1 (s , σ))σ∈S , (c2 (s , σ, σ ))(σ,σ0 )∈S2 ∈ R1+S+S
.
+
For a consumer
born in node


consumption vector
The consumer pref-

erences are assumed to be identical and are represented by the time-separable utility
1+S+S 2
function U : R+
→ R ∪ {−∞} dened as

U (c(st )) = u(c0 (st )) + β

X

π(st , σ)u(c1 (st , σ))

σ∈S

+β

X

2

π(st , σ)π(σ, σ 0 )u(c2 (st , σ, σ 0 )).

σ,σ 0 ∈S2
The one-period utility

Assumption 1.

u

satises the following conditions:

The one-period utility function

tiably strictly increasing (i.e.,

ucc (c) < 0 ∀c > 0),
For each node

u : R+ → R ∪ {−∞}

uc (c) > 0 ∀c > 0),

there exist

J

C 2,

dieren-

dierentiably strictly concave (i.e.,

and satises the Inada condition (i.e.,

st ,

is

limuc (c) = +∞).

c→0

short-lived numeraire assets with xed payouts in

J assets are indexed by a superscript j ∈ J =
t
j t
The equilibrium price of asset j in node s is denoted q (s ). The prices for
t
t
j t
all assets traded in node s are collected in the row vector q(s ) = (q (s ))j∈J .
t
The asset payouts follow a Markov chain such that the payouts in the nodes (s , σ)σ∈S
t
j
j
for the asset j traded in node s are given by the column vector r = (r (σ))σ∈S .
j
Additionally, dene r (σ) = (r (σ))j∈J as the row vector of portfolio payouts for the
current shock σ. The asset payouts can be collected into the S × J payout matrix
terms of the consumption good. The

{1, ..., J} .


R = r1 , ..., rJ = (r (s))s∈S .
7

Assumption 2.

The payout matrix is a non-negative and full rank matrix.

θaj (st )

denote the amount of asset j purchased by a consumer of age a in node
t
The assets pay out in the following period, specically in the nodes (s , σ)σ∈S . The
t
j t
column vector θa (s ) = (θa (s ))j∈J contains the entire portfolio of all assets positions
t
t
of the consumer of age a in node s . The payout of the portfolio in node (s , σ) is
r (σ) θa (st ).
Let

st .

In the initial node

s0 ,

a=1

the age

consumer and the age

a=2

consumer both

enter the period with a portfolio of assets from a previous (unmodeled) period.
can refer to this previous (unmodeled) period as period

t = −1.

We

The portfolios carried

are parameters of the model. The portfolio for the age a = 1

j
consumer in node s0 is denoted θ0 (−1) = θ0 (−1)
as an age a = 1 consumer in
j∈J
node s0 would have age a = 0 in the previous (unmodeled) period t = −1. Likewise,

j
as
the portfolio for the age a = 2 consumer in node s0 is denoted θ1 (−1) = θ1 (−1)
j∈J
an age a = 2 consumer in node s0 would have age a = 1 in the previous (unmodeled)

into the initial node

period

s0

t = −1.

Market clearing for assets traded in node

X2
a=0

θ1 (−1) and q(s0 ),
node s0 is given by:

For any given
in the initial

max

st

is given by:

θaj (st ) = 0 ∀j ∈ J.

the household problem for the age

a=2

u(c2 (s0 ))

.
subj. to c2 (s0 ) + q(s0 )θ2 (s0 ) ≤ e2 (s0 ) + r (s0 ) θ1 (−1)

For any given θ0 (−1) and q (s0 ) , (q(s0 , σ))σ∈S , the household problem
a = 1 consumer in the initial node s0 is given by:
P
max
u(c1 (s0 )) + β
π (s0 , σ) u(c2 (s0 , σ))
c2 (s0 )

consumer

c1 (s0 ),θ1 (s0 ),(c2 (s0 ,σ))σ∈S

for the age

σ∈S

.
c1 (s0 ) + q(s0 )θ1 (s0 ) ≤ e1 (s0 ) + r (s0 ) θ0 (−1)
c2 (s0 , σ) + q(s0 , σ)θ2 (s0 , σ) ≤ e2 (σ) + r (σ) θ1 (s0 ) ∀σ ∈ S

t
For simplicity, dene θ(s ) =
θ0 (st ), (θ1 (st , σ))σ∈S ∈ RJ(1+S) as the entire vector
t
of
 lifetime contingent portfolios for a consumer born in node s . Given asset prices
q(st ), (q(st , σ))σ∈S , (q(st , σ, σ 0 ))σ,σ0 ∈S , the household problem for a consumer born in
subj. to

node

st

is given by:

U (c(st ))

max

c(st ),θ(st )

subj. to

c0 (st ) + q(st )θ0 (st ) ≤ e0 (st )
.
c1 (st , σ) + q(st , σ)θ1 (st , σ) ≤ e1 (σ) + r (σ) θ0 (st )∀σ ∈ S
c2 (st , σ, σ 0 ) + q(st , σ, σ 0 )θ2 (st , σ, σ 0 ) ≤ e2 (σ 0 ) + r (σ 0 ) θ1 (st , σ) ∀ (σ, σ 0 ) ∈ S2
(1)

8

2.2 Equilibrium
We dene a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCE) as follows.

Denition 1. A SCE is a collection of prices and choices of consumers {q(st ), θ(st ), c(st )}
such that:
(i) For each

t

s,

a consumer born in

taking as given the prices

s

t



t

t

t

0



q(s ), (q(s , σ))σ∈S , (q(s , σ, σ ))σ,σ0 ∈S ,

solves (1).

(ii) Commodity market clearing for each

X2
a=0

ca (st ) =

(iii) Asset market clearing for each

st :
X2
a=0

ea (st ).

(2)

st :

X2
a=0

θa (st ) = 0.

(3)

The existence of a SCE can be veried using standard methods (e.g., Balasko and
Shell, 1980; Schmachtenberg, 1988). Moreover, Balasko and Shell (1980) and Schmachtt
enberg (1988) prove that every sequence of equilibrium asset prices {q (s )} is bounded.
t
Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium asset holdings θ2 (s ) = 0 in all date-events.
In all date-events, the old-age consumers will not carry asset holdings into the future.
In the (unmodeled) period

t = −1,

young-age and middle-age consumers receive the

t = 0. The young-age consumers in
period t = −1 are middle-age consumers in period t = 0 and the middle-age consumers
in period t = −1 are old-age consumers in period t = 0. Market clearing must hold for
the (unmodeled) period t = −1, meaning that the parameters θ0 (−1) and θ1 (−1) must

portfolios that they carry into the initial period

satisfy:

θ0j (−1) + θ1j (−1) = 0 ∀j ∈ J.

3

Markov equilibrium and indeterminacy
In this paper, we characterize the entire set of recursive (Markov) equilibrium in

SOLG by adopting the methodology of Feng (2013). We then identify the existence of
indeterminacy by examining the set of recursive equilibrium. In the next section, we
also study the impact of indeterminacy on long-run economy by simulating the models.

3.1 Markov equilibrium
t
First, we will economize on notation. Recall that market clearing in any node s is
t
t
such that θ0 (s ) = −θ1 (s ). Dene the portfolio payout for the age a = 2 consumer in
t
t
t−1
node s as ω (s ) = r (st ) θ1 (s
) ∈ R. This implies that the portfolio payout for the

9

consumer

a=1

consumer in node

st

is

−ω (st ) .

Using these facts, we can rewrite the
t

budget constraints faced by all consumers alive in node

s :

c0 (st ) − q(st )θ1 (st ) ≤ e0 (st ).

(4)


t

c1 (st ) + q(st )θ1 (st ) ≤ e1 (st ) − ω s .

c2 (st ) ≤ e2 (st ) + ω st .

(5)
(6)

One can dene the recursive equilibrium on the natural state space consisting of
t
the current shock st , and the portfolio payout ω (s ) . However, as shown in Kubler
and Polemarchakis (2004), such equilibrium may not exist.

To restore the recursive

formulation of SCE, Feng et al. (2014) enlarge the state space by considering the shadow
values of investment as an additional state variable.

They also develop an iterative

procedure to characterize the recursive equilibrium on this enlarged state space.
In line with Feng et al. (2014), the state variables we consider include the current
t
t
shock st , the portfolio payout ω (s ) , and the shadow values of investment m (s ) =
(mj (st ))j∈J for the age a = 1 consumer in the current node:


mj st = q j (st )uc (c1 (st )).

(7)

S × R × RJ+ with typical element (s, ω, m) ∈ S × R × RJ+ . The
J
J
J
dened as f : S × R × R+ → R+ × R such that (q, θ1 ) = f (s, ω, m)

Denote the state space as
policy function is

satises the following equations:

mj = q j uc [e1 (s) − qθ1 − ω] ∀j ∈ J,
X
mj = β
π(s, σ)uc [e2 (σ) + r (σ) θ1 ] rj (σ) ∀j ∈ J,

(8)
(9)

σ∈S
where equation (8) is the denition of the shadow value of investment, and (9) represents

a = 1.9
S
J
R × RJ+
is a
The expectations correspondence g : S × R × R+ ⇒
from the current period state variables (s, ω, m) to the next period state
(ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S , where (ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ)) ∈ R × RJ+ ∀σ ∈ S. By denition,
the Euler equation for the consumer of age

mapping
variables

(ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S ∈ g (s, ω, m)
i for

(q, θ1 ) = f (s, ω, m)

and

(q 0 (σ) , θ10 (σ)) = f (σ, ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ)) ∀σ ∈ S

the following

conditions are satised:

ω 0 (σ) = r (σ) θ1 ∀σ ∈ S,
X
m0j (σ) j
q j uc [e0 (s) + qθ1 ] = β
π(s, σ) 0j
r (σ) ∀j ∈ J,
q (σ)
σ∈S

(10)
(11)

where equation (10) is the denition of the portfolio payout, and (11) represents the
Euler equation for the consumer of age

9 Additionally,

a = 0.

dene the projections fq : S × R × RJ+ → RJ+ and fθ : S × R × RJ+ → RJ .
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Denition 2. Markov equilibrium is dened by the policy correspondence
V∗ : S × R ⇒

RJ+

and the transition correspondence

F : graph(V∗ ) ⇒ R × RJ+

S

satisfying the fol-

lowing two properties:
1. For all

(s, ω, m) ∈ graph(V∗ ), F (s, ω, m) ⊆ g (s, ω, m) .

(s, ω, m) ∈ graph(V∗ ) and all σ ∈ S, (σ, Fσ (s, ω, m)) ⊆ graph(V∗ ), where
Fσ : graph(V∗ ) ⇒ R × RJ+ is the projection onto the shock σ state variables.

2. For all

We refer to

V∗

as the Markov equilibrium policy correspondence and

F

as the

Markov equilibrium transition correspondence.

Theorem 1.

A Markov equilibrium is a SCE.

Proof. See Section 6.1.

Theorem 2.

A Markov equilibrium exists.

Proof. See Section 6.2.

3.2 Indeterminacy
Given the Markov equilibrium policy correspondence

V∗

and transition correspon-

F, the SCE for a given vector of initial conditions can be determined. The initial
s0 ∈ S, θ1 (−1) ∈ RJ , and m (s0 ) ∈ RJ+ . While both s0 and θ1 (−1) are pa∗
rameters of the model, the shadow prices m (s0 ) ∈ V (s0 , r (s0 ) θ1 (−1)) are endogenous

dence

conditions are

state variables.

•

In period

t = 0,

ω (s0 ) = r (s0 ) θ1 (−1),

given

the vector

(q (s0 ) , θ1 (s0 )) = f (s0 , ω (s0 ) , m (s0 ))
is determined as the unique solution to equations (8) and (9).

(ω(s0 , σ), m (s0 , σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s0 , ω (s0 ) , m (s0 ))

The variables

must be consistent with the tran-

sition correspondence.

•

In period

t > 0,

given

(st , ω (st ) , m (st )) , the vector




q st , θ1 st = f st , ω st , m st

is determined as the unique solution to equations (8) and (9). The variables
(ω(st , σ), m (st , σ))σ∈S ∈ F (st , ω (st ) , m (st )) must be consistent with the transition correspondence.
From the above discussion, we nd that there are two types of indeterminacy: (i)
initial condition indeterminacy and (ii) incomplete markets indeterminacy.
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Denition 3.

Initial condition indeterminacy occurs if

dim (V∗ (s, ω)) > 0

for some

(s, ω) ∈ S × R.
∗
Initial condition indeterminacy is indexed by m (s0 ) ∈ V (s0 , ω (s0 )) , meaning that
∗
if the image of V is determinate, initial condition indeterminacy does not arise.

Denition 4.
some

Incomplete markets indeterminacy occurs if

dim (F (s, ω, m)) > 0

for

(s, ω, m) ∈ S × R × RJ+ .

Theorem 3.

Initial condition indeterminacy is a necessary condition for incomplete

markets indeterminacy.
Proof. This follows by denition.
The relation between the two types of indeterminacy depends upon properties of
the asset structure.

Denition 5.
if

Markets are sequentially complete if

J =S

and sequentially incomplete

J < S.
As seen in Demange (2002) and Henriksen and Spear (2012), sequential completeness

does not suce for (interim) Pareto eciency. Recall from Demange (2002) that a
t
feasible allocation is {c(s )} ≥ 0 such that the resource constraints (2) are satised in
t
all date-events. An allocation {c(s )} is (interim) Pareto ecient if there does not exist
t
t
another feasible allocation {c̃(s )} such that for all possible histories s and all periods

t:
U (c̃(st )) ≥ U (c(st ))
with strict inequality for at least one history

Denition 6.
initial wealth

st .10

The asset markets are complete if for each initial shock

ω (s0 )

s0 ,

there exists

such that the resulting SCE allocation is (interim) Pareto ecient.

As seen in Henriksen and Spear (2012), complete markets is a stronger condition
than sequentially complete markets. While sequentially complete markets is not necessary for incomplete markets indeterminacy, we nd that the stronger condition of
complete markets is necessary.

Theorem 4.

Incomplete markets is a necessary condition for both initial condition

indeterminacy and incomplete markets indeterminacy.
Proof. See Section 6.3.
Our main theoretical result provides a partial converse, namely that incomplete
markets and a stronger notion of initial condition indeterminacy are sucient for incomplete markets indeterminacy.

10 The

denition includes the corresponding conditions for the initial middle-aged and the initial
young consumers.
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Denition 7.
all equilibrium

Theorem 5.

Strong initial condition indeterminacy occurs if

dim (V∗ (s, ω)) > 0

for

(s, ω) ∈ S × R.

An economy with strong initial condition indeterminacy and incomplete

markets will also have incomplete markets indeterminacy.
Proof. See Section 6.4.

4

Computation and Simulation
Knowing that an economy exhibits incomplete markets indeterminacy is of limited

use for welfare analysis.

In this section, we consider a stochastic economy with in-

complete markets and conduct numerical analysis to approximate the long-run eects
of incomplete markets indeterminacy.

To approximate the long-run eects, we use

the methodological contribution in Feng (2013) and Feng et al. (2014) to compute a
numerical approximation of the Markov equilibrium correspondences.

4.1 Numerical specications
We consider an economy with one asset (J
(S

= 2).

= 1)

and two states of uncertainty

There is an exogenous shock that aects the endowments of the household.

Given the shock realization, the endowment of the age

a=2

consumer changes, while

the other endowments remain unchanged. Specically, we assume that

e0 (s) = 3
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1 (s) = 12
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
.
e2 (1) = 1 +   = 0.05
e2 (2) = 1 − 
The transition matrix that governs the Markov chain is given by


Π=

b = 4.


.

c1−b −1
, where the coecient of relative risk
1−b
We set the discount factor β = 0.5.

The utility function is given by:
aversion is

0.95 0.05
0.05 0.95

u(c) =

We borrow these parameter values from Kehoe and Levine (1990), which provides
greater details on the justication of the parameters values chosen for the economy.
To summarize their justication, let one period represent 20 years, meaning that the

β = 0.5

1

0.966 = 0.5 20 .
The risk aversion parameter b implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.25.

discount factor of

corresponds to an annual discount factor of

This is similar to the value chosen by Auerbach and Kotliko (1987).

The life-cycle

earnings prole of the household is hump-shaped as in Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
The asset is a real bond with payouts equal to

1

conditions of the economy are the initial period shock

ω (s0 ) = θ1 (−1),

for both states

The initial

s0 , the initial period bond payout
m (s0 ) .

and the initial shadow value of investment
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s ∈ S.

4.2 Convergence results
We apply the numerical algorithm detailed in Feng (2013) to approximate the
∗
Markov equilibrium policy correspondence V . The numerical approximation will be
termed the Markov policy correspondence

V : S × Θ ⇒ R+ , where Θ ⊆ R is the coma = 1. Such a set is known to exist

pact set of portfolio payouts for consumers of age

since the set of SCE variables is contained in a compact set.
We iterate the algorithm until the Euler equation residuals are bounded above by
some small error bound

 > 0.

Specically, the Markov policy correspondence

V :

S × Θ ⇒ R+ is dened such that for any m ∈ V(s, ω), there exists a vector of variables
q, θ1 , (ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S satisfying (8) and (10) with the Euler equation residuals from
(9) and (11) bounded above by . For the numerical examples we consider, we are
able to compute the Markov policy correspondence V for any arbitrarily small value
 > 0. Citing Theorems 2 and 3 from Feng et al. (2014), the operator B is such that
the xed point V of our numerical approximation converges uniformly to the Markov
∗
equilibrium policy correspondence V as a function of the discrete partition of the state
space. Further details about the discrete version of the operator B and the numerical
algorithm are contained in the Appendix.

4.3 Discussion of incomplete markets indeterminacy
For this numerical verication, we rst compute the Markov policy correspondence

V,

which is the numerical approximation to the Markov equilibrium policy correspon∗
dence V . Given the Markov policy correspondence V, the Markov transition corre
J S
is approximated such that the equations (10)
spondence F : graph(V) ⇒ R × R+
and (11) are satised (the latter with residuals bounded above by ).
Figure 1 in the Appendix contains the graph of the Markov transition correspon
0
dence F. Specically, it contains the variables s, ω, m, (m (σ))σ∈S (for both possible
shocks s ∈ {1, 2}, using the fact that ω is independent of the shock realization s) such
that

(ω 0 (σ) , m0 (σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s, ω, m) ,
ω 0 (σ) = fθ (s, ω, m) . This numerical approximation includes Euler equation residuals bounded above by  > 0 for any arbitrarily small . If the observed incomplete marwhere

kets indeterminacy is simply a result of numerical error, then we should observe that
the graphs in Figure 1 are aected by changes in the errors bound



and the mesh size

of the discretization. Our numerical experiments show that the graphs in Figure 1 do
−10
not change once we reach a certain level of precision, namely an error bound  = 10
−6
and mesh size equal to 10 . Applying Proposition 2 from Feng (2013), we are able to
numerically conrm that the economy exhibits initial condition indeterminacy.
Consider the right panel of Figure 1 in the Appendix, which displays the crosssection of the image of the Markov transition correspondence for both possible shocks

s ∈ {1, 2}.

For both shocks

s ∈ {1, 2},

the possible values for the next period shadow

14

values of investment

(m0 (σ))σ∈{1,2}

belong to a continuum. The dimension of the im-

age of the Markov transition correspondence equals 1. This nding is consistent with
Theorem 5 which implies that the economy has incomplete market indeterminacy.

4.4 Simulation
Once we solve for the Markov equilibrium, we can generate (simulate) a sequential
competitive equilibrium with the following procedure. First, we pick initial condition
(s0 , ω (s0 ) , m (s0 )) ∈ graph (V∗ ) . We solve for (q (s0 ) , θ1 (s0 )) = f (s0 , ω (s0 ) , m (s0 )) .
Second, we use a random number generator to determine the value of

ω (s0 , s1 ) = r(s1 )θ1 (s0 ) .

s1 . 11 By denition,

m (s0 , s1 ) such that (i) we satisfy our selection
(ω (s0 , σ) , m (s0 , σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s0 , ω (s0 ) , m (s0 )). The
nal step is the iterative step in which (s1 , ω (s0 , s1 ) , m (s0 , s1 )) allows us to solve for
(q (s0 , s1 ) , θ1 (s0 , s1 )) = f (s1 , ω (s0 , s1 ) , m (s0 , s1 )) . We continue this process for 5, 000
Third, we pick

rule (described below) and (ii)

periods.

V∗ (s0 , ω (s0 )) ,
(ω (st ) , m (st )) ,

There are a continuum of choices of initial conditions in the image of
and this represents the initial condition indeterminacy. Holding xed

the right panel of Figure 1 graphs the projection of the transition correspondence
F (st , ω (st ) , m (st )) onto (m (st , σ))σ∈S as a function of st . The dashed line refers to
st = 1 and the solid one to st = 2. From Figure 1, there is a continuum of (m (st , σ))σ∈S
consistent with the equilibrium, and this represents the incomplete market indeterminacy.
Each of the selection rules species a certain property that the continuation variables
(m (st , σ))σ∈{1,2} must satisfy, and these properties are held constant for the entire length
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of that simulation.

We consider 8 dierent selection rules:

1. Maximize dierence in asset prices
Given the current period state variables (s, ω, m), the selection rule chooses
(m0 (σ))σ∈S such that (i) (ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s, ω, m) and (ii) the dierence
|q 0 (σ̂) − q| is maximized for the realized shock σ̂ (as determined by the random
0
0
0
number generator), where (q, θ1 ) = f (s, ω, m), ω (σ̂) = r(σ̂)θ1 , and (q (σ̂) , θ1 (σ̂)) =
f (σ̂, ω 0 (σ̂), m0 (σ̂)).
2. Minimize dierence in asset prices.
3. Maximize dierence in bond holdings, i.e., the dierence

|θ10 (σ̂) − θ1 |

is maxi-

mized.
4. Minimize dierence in bond holdings.

11 We

refer the reader to Limic (2009) for the details on simulation of Markov Chain.
selection rules reect the state-of-the-art for equilibrium selection. To design a more disciplined equilibrium selection process is undoubtedly interesting, but goes beyond the scope of the
current paper and is left for future research.
12 Our
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5. Maximize dierence in young consumption, i.e., the dierence

|e0 (s) + qθ1 − (e0 (σ̂) + q 0 (σ) θ10 (σ̂))|
is maximized.
6. Minimize dierence in young consumption.
7. Maximize dierence in middle-age consumption, i.e., the dierence

|e1 (s) − qθ1 − ω − (e1 (σ̂) − q 0 (σ̂) θ10 (σ̂) − ω 0 (σ̂))|
is maximized.
8. Minimize dierence in middle-age consumption.
Notice that we do not consider selections with respect to the old-age consumption
variable. Old-age consumption is

e2 (σ) + θ1 .

Indeterminacy does not play a role in this

value, as the only element that depends upon

σ

is the endowment parameter

e2 (σ).

4.5 Simulation results
θ1 (−1) = 3.0 and the initial shock is s0 = 2,
e2 (s0 ) = 1 − . The initial shadow value of investment is m0 = 5.50, where
m0 ∈ V (s0 , θ1 (−1)) .13 Simulations last for 5, 000 periods, where the rst 1, 000 periods
We choose the initial conditions so that

meaning

are ignored when computing simulated moments and simulated conditional moments.

4.5.1 Eects of the selection rules
We run simulations under each of the 8 selection rules introduced previously. The
unconditional moments are reported in Tables 1 and 2 below.

The rst observation

from the data is that the choice of selection rule matters and has real eects. Among
all 8 selection rules, the young consumption mean is smallest (mean (c0 )
the middle consumption mean is largest (mean (c1 )

= 5.308)

= 5.862)

and

for the selection rule

that maximizes the dierence in bond holdings. Diametrically, among all 8 selection
rules, the young consumption mean is largest (mean (c0 )
consumption mean is smallest (mean (c1 )

= 6.037) and the middle
= 5.293) for the selection rule that minimizes

the dierence in bond holdings. The means for the young consumption can dier by as
much as 3% and the means for middle consumption can dier by as much as 0.3%.
Comparing the simulation in which the asset price dierence is maximized and the
simulation in which the asset price dierence is minimized, the average lifetime utility

13 We

perform robustness checks on the choice of initial conditions and nd that this choice has no
long run eects. Further details can be found in Subsection 4.5.3.
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for the consumers is 3.96% higher under the latter, which corresponds to a consumption
equivalent gain of 1.3%.
statistics
simulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

mean (c0 ) mean (c1 ) mean (θ1 ) mean (q)

∆q
Min ∆q
Max ∆θ1
Min ∆θ1
Max ∆c0
Min ∆c0
Max ∆c1
Min ∆c1
Max

mean (U )

6.025

5.286

3.690

0.842

-0.0072

6.026

5.295

3.680

0.828

-0.0071

5.862

5.308

3.831

0.769

-0.0071

6.037

5.293

3.670

0.833

-0.0071

5.926

5.305

3.769

0.798

-0.0071

6.030

5.294

3.677

0.830

-0.0071

5.896

5.304

3.800

0.784

-0.0071

6.029

5.294

3.677

0.830

-0.0071

Table 1: Simulated means
statistics
simulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

∆q
Min ∆q
Max ∆θ1
Min ∆θ1
Max ∆c0
Min ∆c0
Max ∆c1
Min ∆c1
Max

std (c0 ) std (c1 )

std (θ1 )

std (q)

0.431

0.176

0.403

0.226

0.214

0.072

0.209

0.102

0.474

0.168

0.475

0.195

0.200

0.069

0.191

0.102

0.469

0.153

0.464

0.194

0.224

0.082

0.215

0.115

0.457

0.166

0.452

0.194

0.226

0.078

0.215

0.115

std (U )
9 × 10−4
3 × 10−4
5 × 10−4
3 × 10−4
5 × 10−4
4 × 10−4
5 × 10−4
4 × 10−4

Table 2: Simulated standard deviations

4.5.2 Consumption volatility
Table 3 reports the simulated standard deviations conditional on either shock
or shock

s=2

s=1

being realized.

a = 0 consumers),
consider the 6 simulations that did not include young-age consumption c0 (σ̂) = e0 (σ̂) +
q 0 (σ̂) θ10 (σ̂) in the objective function. Computing the averages across these 6 simulations
and both potential shocks s ∈ {1, 2} , the conditional standard deviations for c0 are 92%
To assess the volatility of the young-age consumption (for age

as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations.

a = 1 consumers),
consider the 6 simulations that did not include middle-age consumption c1 (σ̂) = e1 (σ̂)−
q 0 (σ̂) θ10 (σ̂) − ω 0 (σ̂) in the objective function. Computing the averages across these 6
simulations and both potential shocks s ∈ {1, 2} , the conditional standard deviations
To assess the volatility of the middle-age consumption (for age
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for

c1

are 94% as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations.
statistics
simulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Shock s = 1
Shock s = 2
std (c0 |1) std (c1 |1) std (c0 |2) std (c1 |2)

∆q
Min ∆q
Max ∆θ1
Min ∆θ1
Max ∆c0
Min ∆c0
Max ∆c1
Min ∆c1
Max

0.367

0.168

0.463

0.185

0.176

0.069

0.199

0.075

0.475

0.172

0.447

0.163

0.142

0.063

0.195

0.074

0.257

0.094

0.284

0.101

0.179

0.082

0.210

0.082

0.445

0.161

0.453

0.170

0.179

0.074

0.214

0.081

Table 3: Simulated standard deviations (conditional)
The simulation results (Tables 1-3) reveal three facts: (i) the unconditional standard
deviations for consumption volatility are an order of magnitude larger than the endowment standard deviation, (ii) the conditional standard deviations are strictly positive,
and (iii) the conditional standard deviations are on average more than 90% as large as
the unconditional standard deviations.
These ndings suggest that initial condition indeterminacy is present and that endowment volatility is not of rst-order importance for explaining consumption volatility.

4.5.3 Robustness check on initial conditions
We also analyze the eects of the initial conditions on the behavior of the economy.
For each of the following experiments, we remain consistent by applying the same
selection rule (chosen from one of the 8 possibilities previously introduced) for both the
benchmark economy and for economies with dierent initial conditions. Recall that the

{θ1 (−1), s0 , m0 } = {3.0, 2, 5.50}. The rst experiment
m0 = 5.10, the second species s0 = 1 such that e2 (s0 ) = 1 + , while the
species θ1 (−1) = 4.3128. After we drop the rst 1, 000 periods, the simulated

benchmark economy species
species
third

moments and simulated conditional moments are identical to those for the benchmark
economy.

4.6 Sunspot equilibria
To decompose the eects of incomplete markets indeterminacy and endowment
volatility on consumption and asset price volatility, we construct a sunspot equilibrium based on our benchmark economy. We maintain the same Markov chain, but the
shocks are now states of extrinsic uncertainty, meaning that the endowments remain
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unchanged. The endowment process is given by

e0 (s) = 3
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1 (s) = 12
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
.
e2 (1) = 1 +   = 0
e2 (2) = 1 − 
There still remain

S=2

states of uncertainty, and consumers need not have the same

price expectations for both states. If the price expectations dier, then any consumption
volatility is owing only to the incomplete markets indeterminacy, since the fundamentals
of the economy remain unchanged.
For each of the 8 consistent selection rules, we run
(where each simulation lasts for

5, 000

5, 000 simulations as before
1, 000 periods are ignored

periods and the rst

when computing simulated moments).
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
statistics
simulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

∆q
Min ∆q
Max ∆θ1
Min ∆θ1
Max ∆c0
Min ∆c0
Max ∆c1
Min ∆c1
Max

std (c0 )

std (c1 ) std (θ1 ) std (q)

0.430

0.180

0.395

0.233

0.210

0.088

0.196

0.104

0.497

0.168

0.502

0.189

0.184

0.078

0.166

0.094

0.415

0.149

0.402

0.181

0.197

0.086

0.182

0.010

0.462

0.166

0.461

0.187

0.195

0.081

0.173

0.109

Table 4: Simulated standard deviations (sunspots)
statistics
simulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

∆q
∆q
Max ∆θ1
Min ∆θ1
Max ∆c0
Min ∆c0
Max ∆c1
Min ∆c1

Shock s = 1
Shock s = 2
std (c0 |1) std (c1 |1) std (c0 |2) std (c1 |2)

Max

0.418

0.176

0.443

0.184

Min

0.200

0.088

0.221

0.088

0.495

0.169

0.498

0.168

0.166

0.072

0.200

0.083

0.239

0.096

0.269

0.098

0.198

0.088

0.196

0.083

0.459

0.165

0.498

0.168

0.184

0.080

0.205

0.081

Table 5: Simulated standard deviations (conditional, sunspots)
Broken down by variable, the following subsections show that the volatility for
any of the variables (consumption, asset price, asset choice) is driven by the eects of
incomplete markets indeterminacy and not by the endowment shocks.
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4.6.1 Consumption volatility
To assess the volatility of young-age consumption, consider the 6 simulations that
did not include young-age consumption in the objective function. Averaged across these
6 simulations, the standard deviations for young-age consumption in the sunspot model
(no endowment risk) are 97% as large as the standard deviations in the original model
with endowment risk. Similar patterns hold for middle-age consumption. If the sunspot
model accounts for 97% of the consumption volatility, then the volatility is decomposed
as 3% due to endowment shocks and 97% due to indeterminacy.

4.6.2 Asset price volatility
To assess the volatility of the asset prices, consider the 6 simulations that did not
0
include the asset price q (σ̂) in the objective function. Averaged across these 6 simulations, the unconditional standard deviations for

q

in the sunspot model (no endowment

risk) are 93% as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations with endowment risk. The range for this ratio across all 6 simulations runs from 87% to 97%.

4.6.3 Asset size volatility
In the sunspot model, since

c2 (σ̂) = e2 (σ̂) + θ1

and the endowment value is equal

across states, then the old-age consumption volatility is identical to the asset size volatility.
To assess the volatility of the asset holdings themselves, consider the 6 simulations
0
that did not include the asset choice θ1 (σ̂) in the objective function. Averaged across
these 6 simulations, the unconditional standard deviations for

θ1

in the sunspot model

(no endowment risk) are 89% as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations with endowment risk. The range for this ratio across all 6 simulations runs from
81% to 100%.

4.7 Economies with initial condition determinacy
A sucient condition for initial condition determinacy is the property of gross substitution in consumption. While sucient, this property is not necessary. In a deterministic setting, Kehoe and Levine (1990) and Feng (2013) nd economies that do not
satisfy this sucient condition and yet exhibit initial condition determinacy.
In a stochastic setting, nding the set of economies that lead to initial condition
determinacy remains just as relevant. We consider two experiments in which the economy parameters are changed.
risk-aversion is reduced from

In the rst experiment, the parameter for consumer

b=4

to

b = 3.2,

with all other parameters held constant.

In the second experiment, the endowment process is changed from
to

e = {3, 8, 2 ± 5%},

e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%}

with all other parameters held constant. The two endowment
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processes are given by:

e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%}
e0 (s) = 3
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1 (s) = 12
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e2 (1) = 1 +   = 0.05
e2 (2) = 1 − 

e = {3, 8, 2 ± 5%}
e0 (s) = 3
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1 (s) = 8
∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e2 (1) = 2 +   = 0.10
e2 (2) = 2 − 

For each of the two experiments, we compute simulated moments as in the original
economy.

We numerically conrm that the two economies exhibit initial condition

and incomplete markets determinacy.

We do not need to implement selection rules,
(ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S =

since there exists a unique vector of state variables each period:

F (s, ω, m) .
The simulated moments are given in Table 6. For the rst experiment (with b
std(θ1 )
= 0.0085, which is 10% as large
changed from b = 4 to b = 3.2), the ratio
mean(θ1 )
as the average ratio across all simulations in the model with b = 4 (average across all
std(θ1 )
std(q)
= 0.088). In terms of prices, the ratio mean(q)
= 0.0399, which is
simulations is
mean(θ1 )

20% as large as the average ratio across all simulations in the model with b = 4 (average
std(q)
across all simulations is
= 0.192).
mean(q)
For the second experiment (with e changed from e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%} to e = {3, 8, 2 ±
std(θ1 )
5%}), the ratio mean(θ
= 0.0161, which is 20% as large as the average across all
1)
8 simulations in the model with e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%}. In terms of prices, the ratio
std(q)
= 0.0896, which is 50% as large as the average across all 8 simulations in the
mean(q)
model with e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%}.
Model

mean (θ1 )

mean (q) std (θ1 ) std (q)

b = 3.2;e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%}
b = 4;e = {3, 8, 2 ± 5%}

5.030

0.331

0.0431

0.0132

2.730

0.346

0.044

0.031

Table 6: Simulated moments (determinacy)
Relative to the baseline economy, a reduction in the risk-aversion parameter or
a reduction in the volatility of the endowment process can lead to initial condition
determinacy.

Initial condition determinacy implies incomplete markets determinacy

(Theorem 3), meaning that determinacy does not have long-run eects. The simulation
results in Table 6 reveal that economies with initial condition determinacy have asset
price and asset holding volatilities on the same order of magnitude as the endowment
volatility. Moreover, the asset price and asset holding volatilities for the determinate
economies are

10 − 50%

as large as the corresponding volatilities for nearby economies

with incomplete markets indeterminacy.

4.8 Discussion of the example economy
Well-known empirical puzzles concerning asset price and consumption volatility document that the observed volatility of both variables is higher than what is predicted
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from classical theory.

14

This paper does not attempt to solve these empirical puzzles,

but rather to understand what role, if any, incomplete markets indeterminacy plays in
supporting asset price and consumption volatility. We study simple economies in which
the eects of indeterminacy on asset price and consumption volatility are easily elicited,
and thus only utilize a stylized calibration as in Kehoe and Levine (1990).
The cohorts in our economies consist of a unit mass of homogeneous households that
each live for 3 periods. This is the simplest setting in which asset trade is nontrivial.
The mechanism under which indeterminacy has real eects requires nontrivial asset
trade: households form beliefs about the asset prices in future periods, trade assets
based upon these beliefs, and use the asset payouts to smooth consumption. We view
each period as lasting for 20 years and impose a life-cycle earnings prole consistent
with Auerbach and Kotliko (1987) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
Without a more realistic calibration, our numerical results provide an incomplete
answer to the question of whether incomplete markets indeterminacy in SOLG models
provides a theoretical foundation for the asset price and consumption volatility observed
in the data.

What we have learned is that incomplete markets indeterminacy does

matter; it has real eects and these persist in the long run. The next step is to evaluate
the degree to which our numerical results extend to a more realistic setting. Does the
scale of the model matter? Our theoretical results and computational methodology are
both immediately applicable to a large scale model, but in a large scale model, the
relation between indeterminacy and volatility becomes blurred and the computation
becomes untractable.
In the current model, households live for 60 years (the expected lifespan for adults),
but only receive 3 realizations of uncertainty during their lifetime. In a large scale model,
households would continue to live for 60 years, but would instead receive realizations
of uncertainty every year (or every quarter). The partition of uncertainty will be ner,
and households will be able to trade on this uncertainty with higher frequency.

We

hypothesize that the eects of indeterminacy will be amplied with higher frequency
trading, as households have more opportunities to form self-fullling beliefs about asset
prices in future periods.

14 The

excess volatility puzzle (see LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981)) documents that asset
price volatility is much higher than what is predicted by classical theory with additively separable and
CRRA utility for a representative household. The closely related equity premium puzzle is based upon
the recognition that it is not possible to adjust the risk aversion parameter and reconcile the model with
both the equity premium and the risk-free rate observed in the data (see Mehra and Prescot (1985) and
Weil (1989)). For further discussion of asset pricing volatility, see Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and
Backus, Chernov, and Zin (2014). Consumption volatility refers to the fact that observed consumption
volatility is much greater than what is predicted by the Permanent Income Hypothesis, which can be
interpreted as a setting with complete nancial markets (see Krueger and Perri (2006)).
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Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the eects of indeterminacy on consumption and asset

price volatility in SOLG models.

We introduce the concept of incomplete markets

indeterminacy and compute its eects by (i) approximating the entire set of competitive
equilibria and (ii) running simulations over a variety of selection rules. Our simulations
indicate that the choice of selection rule has welfare eects.

Even for the selection

rules with the most conservative predictions, we nd that indeterminacy is an order of
magnitude more important than endowment risk in explaining consumption and asset
price volatility.
These ndings suggest that for economies in which indeterminacy is present, consumers' expectations of prices play an important role in the allocation of resources. It
is only in understanding how these expectations aect resource allocation that we can
implement welfare-improving policies. Analysis of specic welfare-improving policies in
this class of models is left for future research.
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6

Appendix

6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To show that a Markov equilibrium satises the SCE denition, the Euler equations
(9) and (11) must be necessary and sucient for household optimality.

Necessity is

immediate. Suciency follows as households are nite-lived.

6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
From the standard arguments used to show the existence of a SCE, the set of shadows
t
J
prices of investment m (s ) belong to a compact set ∆ ⊆ R in all nodes. The iterative
J
construction begins with the correspondence V0 : S × R ⇒ R+ such that V0 (s, ω) = ∆

∀ (s, ω) ∈ S × R.
Vn : S × R ⇒ RJ+ for any n ≥ 0, dene an operator B that
Vn : S × R ⇒ RJ+ to a new correspondence Vn+1 : S × R ⇒

Given a correspondence
maps the correspondence
RJ+ dened as follows:







(q, θ1 ) = f (s, ω, m) ,
0
there exists m (σ) ∈ Vn (σ, r(σ)θ1 )∀σ ∈ S and
Vn+1 (s, ω) = m ∈ ∆ : (q 0 (σ) , θ10 (σ)) = f (σ, r(σ)θ1 , m0 (σ))∀σ ∈ S such that

P
0j (σ)



rj (σ) ∀j ∈ J
q j uc [e0 (s) + qθ1 ] = β
π(s, σ) mq0j (σ)
for

σ∈S

The correspondences are dened recursively using this operator







.






B:

Vn+1 = B (Vn ) .
The Markov equilibrium policy correspondence is dened as follows:

V∗ (s, ω) = lim B (Vn (s, ω)) ∀ (s, ω) ∈ S × R.
n→∞

Theorem 1 from Feng et al. (2014), reproduced below, guarantees the existence of a
Markov equilibrium policy correspondence.

Theorem 6.

V0 be a compact-valued correspondence such that V0 ⊃ V∗ . Let
Vn+1 = B (Vn ) , n ≥ 0. Then, Vn → V∗ as n → ∞. Moreover, V∗ is the largest xed
∗
point of the operator B, i.e., if V = B(V), then V ⊂ V .
Let

6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that the markets are complete. This
implies that the allocation is (interim) Pareto ecient. The equilibrium allocation is
∗
stationary (see Henriksen and Spear, 2012). This implies that both V and F are
single-valued correspondences.
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6.4 Proof of Theorem 5
The transition correspondence

F (s, ω, m) =







(ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S





By denition of

F : graph(V∗ ) ⇒ R × RJ+

S

dened by

ω 0 (σ) = r(σ)fθ (s, ω, m)
m0 (σ) ∈ V∗ (σ, ω 0 (σ))
:
q 0 (σ) = fq (σ, ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))
P
0k (σ)
q j uc [e0 (s) + qθ1 ] = β
π(s, σ) mq0k (σ)
rj (σ) ∀j, k ∈ J
σ∈S

fq (σ, ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ)) :
m01 (σ)
m0k (σ)
=
∀k.
q 0k (σ)
q 01 (σ)

This means that the

J

Euler equations given by:

q j uc [e0 (s) + qθ1 ] = β

X

π(s, σ)

σ∈S

m01 (σ) j
r (σ) ∀j ∈ J.
q 01 (σ)

Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that incomplete markets indeterminacy
does not hold.

is determinate (0−dimensional image)
∗
0
Under initial condition indeterminacy, V (σ, ω (σ)) is

This implies that

for all state variables

(s, ω, m) .

F (s, ω, m)

indeterminate (strictly positive dimension) for all state variables (s, ω, m) (with cor0
responding state variable (σ, ω (σ) = r(σ)fθ (s, ω, m))). This implies that for all state
0
0
15
variables (s, ω, m) , ∃! (ω (σ), m (σ))σ∈S such that the Euler equations are satised.
0
0
0
0
0
If (ω (σ), m (σ))σ∈S is uniquely determined, then with q (σ) = fq (σ, ω (σ), m (σ)) , the
vector





m01 (σ)
q 01 (σ)

m01 (σ)
q 01 (σ)





is uniquely determined.

σ∈S

is uniquely determined, the Euler equations for both the young and
σ∈S
middle-aged consumer imply:
If

(uc [e1 (σ) − ω 0 (σ) − q 0 (σ) θ10 (σ)])σ∈S
(uc [e2 (σ) + ω 0 (σ)])σ∈S
=
.
uc [e0 (s) + qθ1 ]
uc [e1 (s) − ω − qθ1 ]
For all state variables

(s, ω, m) ,

it is not possible to nd a Pareto-improving re-

allocation. This means that the allocation is (interim) Pareto ecient, meaning that
markets are complete. This completes the argument.

6.5 Numerical Algorithm

N
Θ̂ = θ0i1 i1θ=1 ,


Ns
Ŝ = si02 i2 =1 . For each pair of the bond-holding and shock grids, θ0i1 , si02 , we also de
µ,ε
ne a nite vector of possible values for the image of the correspondence: V̂0
θ0i1 , si02 =
The vector of possible values for bond-holding and shocks are given by

15 With

multiple vectors (ω 0 (σ), m0 (σ))σ∈S satisfying the Euler equations, any vector in the convex
hull would also satisfy the Euler equations. The convex hull is a set with strictly positive dimension.
This is inconsistent with the initial supposition that F (s, ω, m) is determinate.
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.

N v 16
.
j=1



limNθ →∞ Θ̂ = Θ, limN v→∞ V̂0µ,ε θ0i1 , si02 = Ṽ0µ,ε θ0i1 , si02 . Fih,µ,N
nally, we construct the discrete version of operator B
by eliminating points (in the
Euler equation, for a predetermined tolerance  > 0) as follows:


i1 ,i2 ,j
µ,ε
i1 ,i2 ,j
i1 i2
i1 i2
we
,
s
θ
in the vector V̂0
1. Given θ0 , s0 , pick a point m0
0 . From m0
0

0 i ,i ,j
i1 ,i2 ,j
1 2
can determine the values of θ
by solving for
,q


0
(12)
mi01 ,i2 ,j − q i1 ,i2 ,j · uc e1 (si02 ) + θ0i1 − q i1 ,i2 ,j θ i1 ,i2 ,j = 0.


X
0
(13)
mi01 ,i2 ,j − β
π(s0 |s0 )uc e2 (s0 i1 ,i2 ,j = 0


mi01 ,i2 ,j

Notice,

s0
Thus, if for all

min
m0 ∈{m0l }

NV

q

 0 0
0
m0 ∈ V̂0µ,ε (θ i1 ,i2 ,j , s0 ) = m l (θ i1 ,i2 ,j , s0 )

i1 ,i2 ,j

· uc



e0 (si02 )

−q

i1 ,i2 ,j

θ

0i

1 ,i2 ,j



−β

X

NV
l=1

π(s

we have

0

|si02 )



m0
q0


>

(14)

l=1

0
where the value of q is determined by the same procedure in nding


µ,ε
then V̂1
θ0i1 , si02 = V̂0µ,ε θ0i1 , si02 − mi01 ,i2 ,j .
2. Iterate over all possible values

0

θ i1 ,i2 ,j , q i1 ,i2 ,j





mi01 ,i2 ,j ∈ V̂0µ,ε θ0i1 , si02 , and all possible θ0i1 , si02 ∈

Θ̂ × Ŝ.
3. Iterate until convergence is achieved

µ,ε
= 0.
sup V̂nµ,ε − V̂n−1

At the limit of the above algorithm, we have

∗

limn→∞ V̂nµ,ε = V̂µ,ε .

6.6 Figure

16 Notice

the portfolio of the household has S components in stochastic case. In the case of two
shocks, θ0 = (θ0,1 , θ0,2 ).
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at given

{s, ω}.

6.5

